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Abstract 
It is argued here that because a cryptocurrency has no intrinsic value, problems 
relating to day-to-day valuation and pricing arise. It is shown how these lead to 
the reversal of the conventional relationship between supply and demand and 
the susceptibility of the cryptocurrency markets to irrationality and speculative 
bubbles arising from the herding instinct. Also, as the cryptocurrency markets 
are largely free of regulation and the desire for privacy by founders, owners and 
developers is so great, accountability and disclosure requirements are either 
minimal or non-existent, leading to the manipulation of cryptocurrency prices, 
volume and market capitalisation information. Another consequence of their 
freedom from regulation, particularly surprising given the importance placed on 
their security through the use of blockchain, is the magnitude of thefts of 
cryptocurrency (both in terms of frequency and size) levels of which would 
neither be expected nor tolerated in regulated financial markets. 
 
 
* This paper was presented at a conference organised by the University of 
Sydney Business School entitled ‘Blockchain, fintech, cryptocurrencies: Business 
policy and legal perspectives’ on 9 November 2018. 
** Paul Barnes is a semiretired professor of finance and accounting who now 
acts as an expert witness in financial crime. 
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Cryptocurrency and its susceptibility to speculative bubbles, 
manipulation, scams and fraud 
 
Introduction 
It is the purpose of this paper to examine the trading and popularity of 
cryptocurrencies as investments and the susceptibility of their pricing to 
speculative bubbles, manipulation, scams and fraud. It is well-known that stock 
market prices are susceptible to such occurrences and I have argued elsewhere 
the relevance of Keynes’ biggest fool theory (BFT) and Minsky’s financial 
instability hypothesis (FIH) as explanations of market irrationality and financial 
bubbles. However, the workings of cryptocurrency markets are quite different 
to those of other financial assets making cryptocurrencies even more 
susceptible to this behaviour. I also argue here that they are particularly 
vulnerable to manipulation, frauds and scams. The paper is arranged as follows. 
It is first necessary to briefly identify characteristics of cybercurrency leading to 
the problem of day-to-day valuation and pricing. I then briefly describe BFT and 
FIH as they apply to cryptocurrency and how, because of the lack of an intrinsic 
value to guide market price, the conventional relationship between supply and 
demand is reversed. The next section relates to the likelihood of scams such as 
pump and dump schemes and the manipulation of cryptocurrency prices, 
volume and their market capitalisation. The paper then addresses the frauds 
that have occurred in the related ICO market and the thefts of cryptocurrency 
that have occurred, somewhat surprisingly given the importance placed on 
security and the use of blockchain. The final section briefly discusses the need 
for greater regulation. 
 
What is cryptocurrency?  
Fiat currencies (money that governments have declared to be legal tender 
without the backing of physical commodities) exist because we have confidence 
in them. Money is a concept; if it is not trusted, it will not be accepted and not 
work. Old U.K. notes contained the words ‘I promise to pay the bearer of this 
note … [five, ten, twenty pounds and so on, whatever the denomination] 
sterling’ and, theoretically at least, the note could be taken to the Bank of 
England and exchanged for gold or silver. Other countries’ currency notes 
contained similar wording. Nowadays, notes and coins are not supported in that 
way but are accepted because users have the confidence that they can be 
exchanged for goods and services. It is not surprising, therefore that in this 
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Internet age, cryptocurrencies have been developed and are accepted by users 
so long as they have confidence they can be used as a means of exchange. 
 
A cryptocurrency is a digital or virtual currency and does not physically exist. It 
is a type of digital currency that uses cryptography for chaining together digital 
signatures of asset transfers to create and manage the currency.i It is used either 
as a means of payment for which there are several advantages (e.g. privacy) and 
disadvantages (cost and lack of universality) or as an investment for which there 
are attractions (e.g. the chance to make quick profits) and problems (e.g. risk 
and fraud). The distinguishing feature of cryptocurrencies is their decentralized 
control as opposed to centralized electronic money and central banking systems 
by means of what is known as a a ‘blockchain’ which is a public transaction 
database, functioning as a distributed ledger. 
 
Cryptocurrency can be obtained in the same way as other currency. It can also 
be traded directly between peers or bought through a broker or service provider 
and traded on online cryptocurrency exchanges similar to a stock or foreign 
currency exchange. A cryptocurrency exchange (or digital currency exchange 
‘DCE’) is a business that enables customers to trade cryptocurrencies for either 
conventional money or other cryptocurrencies. They can either be market 
makers that typically take the bid-ask spreads as remuneration or simply charge 
fees as matching platforms. Some are conventional businesses, others are 
simply online businesses, exchanging electronically transferred money. Their 
location may determine how or whether they are even regulated as these vary 
across jurisdictions. Cryptocurrency exchanges are developing, providing the 
same market trading facilities as the capital markets (e.g. leverage provided by 
spread betting and derivatives such as Contracts for Difference, ‘CFD’ii).  
 
Table 1 
Market information for four of the most popular cryptocurrencies  
(31 October, 2018) 
 
Cryptocurrency Marcap  
    (a) 
   $bn 
 
Price   
1 Nov  
2018 (b) 
    $ 
 Price   
1 Nov  
2017  
(b) $ (c) 
Year 
return % 
(c to b) 
Circulating 
supply 
(a/b)  
    m 
Volume 
(24 hr)  
    $m 
Bitcoin 110.9 6,342.61 6124.28 3.5 17.4 4,156 
Ethereum 20.55 197.85 306.8 -35.5 103.9 1,448 
Litecoin 2.942 49.68 56.22 -11.63 59.2 352 
Bitcoin Cash 7.397 425.36 444.92 -4.4 17.39 283 
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Source: https://coinmarketcap.com/ 
Today, there are more than 2,000 cryptocurrencies available over the internet 
with a current total market value of $205bn.iii and new ones are created any 
time. Bitcoin was the first and is still the most famous cryptocurrency 
successfully demonstrating the viability of a cryptographic-backed public money 
supply that is open to anyone. Bitcoin was launched in 2009 by Satoshi 
Nakamoto who designed the cryptocurrency, famously stating that society 
needed an electronic payment system based on cryptographic proof instead of 
trust (Nakamoto, 2014) and creating the standardised specifications from which 
the payment system has and continues to evolve.iv Its success led to the creation 
of other cryptocurrencies (sometimes called altcoins, short for alternative coins) 
such as Ethereum, Litecoin, Ripple, Namecoin and PPCoin.  Table 1 shows basic 
market information about some of the largest.  
 
Cryptocurrencies have many attractive features. They can be accessed through 
software and held in ‘wallets’. This makes it easier to securely transfer funds 
between two parties, avoiding the large fees charged by most financial 
institutions. They are difficult to counterfeit because of their use of 
cryptographyv as it is not issued by an official authority, a cryptocurrency is free 
from government interference ensuring transactions are private but also making 
it suited for various nefarious activities, such as money laundering and tax 
evasion.vi Cryptocurrency also plays an important role in the adult 
entertainment and sex work industries. It has been also been embraced by those 
in poor countries, notably in Africa desperate to supplement their income. See 
https://bitcoinafrica.io/. 
 
On the other hand, because cryptocurrencies are virtual and do not have a 
central repository, a digital cryptocurrency balance can be wiped out by a 
computer crash if a backup copy of the holdings does not exist. Also, as the price 
of a cryptocurrency is based on supply and demand, its ‘rate of exchange’ (i.e. 
its value) can fluctuate widely.  
 
Trading cryptocurrency 
The problem of valuation 
Because the prices of cryptocurrencies are so volatile, they are seen by punters 
as an easy way of making profits. It is not clear why prices should rise or fall as 
there is no means to value them unlike most other financial assets. This section 
examines these issues. 
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It is reasonably easy to estimate the value of most types of financial assets in 
order to assess their price.  This is particularly easy in the case of coins and notes, 
bills of exchange, promissory notes and so on as their payoffs are specified and 
merely dependent on confidence that they will be paid. Stocks, shares and 
bonds (and related derivatives) are valued differently. Whilst they are subject to 
speculative bubbles etc, it is usually possible to calculate an intrinsic value which 
will help to limit or place a check on irrationality. Buyers and sellers may refer to 
valuation models, e.g. book- or market-value, the capital asset pricing model etc. 
and arbitrage and are able to compare returns with comparable alternatives 
(Barnes, 2019, p.26-38).  By comparing the price of a stock with his/her view of 
its intrinsic value, an investor may decide to buy, sell or continue to hold it. (If 
the market price is significantly above the intrinsic value, the investor should 
consider selling it, similarly, if the price is below the intrinsic value, he/she 
should consider buying more). Hence, the release of new information relevant 
to the company’s prospects is likely to affect its share price as investors are likely 
to revise their estimates of its intrinsic value. It follows that at any one point in 
time, the market value of a share represents the market’s opinion of its worth 
and the collective view of investors and experts. i.e. based on all that is publicly 
known about the stock. 
 
For these reasons, the stock market is said to be ‘informationally efficient’ 
leading to an efficient (or ‘optimal’) allocation of resources within the economy 
(known as ‘allocative efficiency’). However, it was not until the early 1960s that 
the full implications of stock market efficiency were studied. These were 
brought together by Eugene Fama in 1970 who developed the ‘efficient capital 
markets hypothesis’ (‘ECMH’) that share prices fully reflect all available 
information and that there were three forms of stock market efficiency: 
 
1. The Weak Form: This states that as all new information about the company is 
immediately and fully reflected in and by a new price movement. As we are 
unable to forecast future news, and past news is fully impounded in an existing 
share price. It is not possible to predict new share movements from old share 
price movements. It follows that the movement in a share price on one day is 
not correlated with the share price change the following day. This is often 
referred to as a ‘random walk’.vii The principal implication of this is that an 
investor cannot use past share price movements to predict new price 
movements in an attempt to outperform the market. It also follows that 
information about recent trends in stock prices would be of no use in selecting 
stocks and studying patterns in the movement in a company’s shares in order to 
earn abnormal returns is futile.  
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There have been many empirical studies of the weak form. They have almost 
unanimously concluded that there is no correlation between one day’s share 
price change and the next. Economists have usually concluded that this supports 
the ECMH. However, it should be noted that this also supports an alternative 
hypothesis - that share price movements are totally unrelated to the provision 
of new information and, as a result, move randomly. We will examine this later 
in the paper.  
 
2. The Semi- Strong Form: This states that share prices adjust immediately and 
once and for all to new information as it becomes publicly available. It follows 
that as current market prices reflect all publicly available information, no one 
can consistently out-perform the stock market and earn abnormal returns. 
There is, therefore, no point in attempting to do so. The important point about 
the semi-strong form is that it refers only to publicly available information and 
recognises the existence of inside information in which those in possession of it 
can out-perform the stock market.  
 
3. The Strong Form: This states that current market prices reflect all relevant 
information, whether publicly available or privately held. It is generally believed 
that all large stock markets are efficient in the weak and semi-strong forms but 
are not efficient in the strong form and insiders and others who profit from 
inside information exist on a fairly large scale. Whilst academics have had access 
to the necessary information to test the other forms of the ECMH, they are 
usually unable to test the strong form because of the secrecy of inside traders.  
 
The prices of foreign currencies, commodities etc are also determined largely by 
supply and demand as market makers attempt to balance the two. This, 
together with the effects of arbitrage and the large volume of trade helps 
stabilise prices and leads to ‘efficient’ pricing. (For a discussion of these issues 
see Barnes, 2018.)  
 
The day-to-day price of cryptocurrencies is similar. The price at any point in time 
is a result of trading that is happening on the exchanges as market makers 
attempt to manage order books comprising lists of people willing to buy or sell 
at different prices. The determination of prices in this way is referred to as ‘price 
discovery’ in which the price of the last trade on the exchange forms the basis 
for the quoted price. Prices may vary slightly across exchanges depending on the 
last trade price but minimised by ‘aggregators’ who look into what is happening 
across exchanges and calculate the average to get an appropriate value.  
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Figure 1 
The interaction of supply and demand 
 
1a. Financial assets, where there is an intrinsic value available. 
 
 
 
 
1b. A cryptocurrency, where there is no intrinsic value available. 
 
                            
 
 
Most prices are determined by the interaction of supply and demand in one way 
or another. In the case of goods and services, the demand curve is downward 
sloping and the supply curve is upward sloping,viii the price and output being 
determined by their intersection. In the case of financial assets where there is 
an intrinsic value, the supply and demand curves will be similar (upward and 
downward, respectively) as prices depart from the intrinsic value. See Figure 1a. 
As the market price falls below the intrinsic value, investors will become keener 
to buy and more reluctant to sell the investment as they see it is relatively cheap. 
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Similarly, if the market price rises above the intrinsic value, investors will 
become keener to sell and reluctant to buy as they see the investment as 
relatively expensive.  
 
The above analysis assumes that there is an intrinsic value available to investors 
and (for diagrammatic simplicity) its value is stationary. In the case of a 
cryptocurrency, where there is no intrinsic value available and a limited number 
of market makers, the supply and demand curves will be reversed, i.e. 
downwards and upwards, respectively, as investors’ incentives are as follows. If 
the cryptocurrency’s price rises and they expect this to continue (and in the 
absence of information to the contrary this is reasonable) the demand for the 
cryptocurrency will rise as its price rises and its supply will decrease. (This is likely 
to occur (a) because of the reluctance of investors to sell when they expect the 
price to rise and (b) the restrictions on the supply of new coins from mining). 
Similarly, if its price is falling and investors are expecting this to continue, then 
their demand for it will fall and its supply will increase (as investors wish to sell 
before the price falls further). See Figure 1b.  
 
Trading cryptocurrency for profit 
The stock of a cryptocurrency comprises those coins that were initially issued by 
the founders and those that were subsequently mined. The supply at any point 
in time consists of those that founders, miners, brokers and service providers 
and investors hold, the numbers available for sale depending on the offer price. 
 
Diagram 1a assumed for simplicity that the intrinsic value remained stationery. 
In practice, of course, this is unlikely as changing economic factors and other 
news are received and affect a stock’s intrinsic value. In the case of a 
cryptocurrency, as it has no intrinsic value, economic and financial information 
are irrelevant. As there is no information available to help investors decide 
whether the price of a cryptocurrency will rise or fall in the short term, all they 
can do is attempt to estimate supply and demand. And as there is no information 
about this other than historical information of the daily volume of transactions, 
the best that can be done is to use this on which to base expectations. For 
example, if the volume is increasing or relatively high and prices are rising/falling 
then it may be reasonable to conclude that this will continue.  
 
Market Irrationality 
In the previous section it was argued that it is only possible to out-perform the 
stock market if an investor is able to forecast better than the market as a whole 
or has inside information. In this section, it is argued that in order to protect or 
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maximise his/her returns, it is also necessary for the investor to forecast, not 
what the market should believe, but what it is likely to believe as it is not always 
rational but has fads, fashions, moods and susceptible to the herding instinct. 
 
Large price rises (‘spikes’) followed by collapse, often referred to as ‘speculative 
bubbles’, and their irrationality more generally, are nowadays a recognised 
feature of the financial markets. The term ‘irrational exuberance’ is also used to 
describe the phenomenon but, although a recent term, does not represent a 
new theory or offer a new understanding of the reasons for the occurrence. ix 
The phenomenon was first recognized by Charles Mackay writing in 1841 who 
cited various examples of what he called ‘delusions and madness’, the most 
famous case being ‘tulipmania’ in Holland.  
 
The story of tulipmania begins in 1559 when the first tulip bulbs were brought 
from Constantinople to Holland and Germany, and people fell in love with the. 
Soon tulips became a status symbol for the wealthy, their bulbs hard to 
get.  Although early buyers were people who truly prized the lovely flowers, later 
buyers primarily considered their bulbs an investment. Soon speculators 
became involved and tulip bulbs began to be traded on the local exchanges. By 
1634, the craze of owning tulips had spread to the Dutch middle classes and 
merchants and shopkeepers vied with one another for single tulip bulbs. At the 
height of tulip mania in 1635, a single tulip bulb was worth £20,000 in today’s 
prices. Tulip bulbs were traded on the Amsterdam Stock Exchange and other 
exchanges in Europe. Trade grew so rapidly that tulip notaries and clerks were 
appointed to record transactions and public laws and regulations were 
developed to control the tulip craze. However, by 1636, people began to sell 
their holdings and the price of tulip bulbs began to weaken, slowly at first, and 
then rapidly. Confidence was soon destroyed, and panic seized the market. 
Within six weeks, prices had fallen by 90 per cent and defaults on contracts were 
widespread. At first the Dutch government refused to interfere but later was 
forced to act. All contracts prior to November 1636 were declared null and void 
but prices continued to fall. In Amsterdam, judges unanimously refused to 
uphold tulip contracts and treated them as gambling activities and no court in 
Holland would enforce payment. The price of tulip bulbs eventually fell to, in 
real terms, less than their price today.  
 
Perhaps the final word on irrationality in financial markets should be left to Isaac 
Newton who, like Jonathan Swift, had lost money on the South Sea bubble (circa 
1720) when he remarked ‘I can calculate the movement of the stars, but not the 
madness of men’.x 
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Keynes’ biggest fool theory 
Keynes (1936) was the first to develop an explanation of this behaviour: what is 
referred to as his ‘biggest fool’ theory. He argued that investors do not estimate 
an asset’s intrinsic value mentioned earlier to compare with the market price. 
Instead, he said, investors are more interested in whether a share price will rise 
and, then, if other investors also think it will rise. In Keynes’ opinion, this was 
rational; a company’s intrinsic value is largely irrelevant. He used the analogy of 
attempting to forecast the winner of a beauty contest. Around that time, it was 
common for London newspapers to run competitions requiring readers to 
choose a set of six faces from 100 photographs of women that were the ‘most 
beautiful’. The names of those who picked the most popular faces were then 
entered into a raffle for a prize. The most obvious strategy would be to choose 
the six faces that, in the opinion of the reader, are the most beautiful. Keynes 
said that a better approach would be to attempt to identify those faces most 
likely to be chosen by the public. This could be carried one step further to take 
into account the fact that other entrants would also be basing their decision on 
forecasts of competitors’ opinions. The strategy could be extended to the next 
order and so on, at each level attempting to predict the eventual outcome of 
the process based on the reasoning of others. 
 
Keynes believed that the stock market behaved in a similar way. People priced 
shares, not on what they thought a stock’s intrinsic value was, but on what they 
thought everyone else thought it was worth. If an investor thought that the price 
of a share would rise and that other investors would buy it, he/she would also 
buy, increasing the demand for the stock and forcing its price up further. 
Eventually, the price would be so far removed from reality that investors would 
realise this and stop buying. The process would then go into reverse where 
investors think the share price will fall and decide to sell. The person who bought 
at the top of the market was described by Keynes as the ‘biggest fool’. Although 
Keynes used the theory primarily to explain the role of interest rate movements 
in the economy (Keynes, 1936) his understanding derives from his own dealings 
on the stock market on behalf of his Cambridge college which were very 
successful earning it millions of pounds.  
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Figure 2 
The Minsky moment 
  
The irrationality of the markets as an important factor in financial history is well 
known and well documented. Kindleberger and Aliber (2011) argue and present 
examples to show that financially fuelled boom-and-bust cycles frequently 
occur. They extend the notion of irrationality of financial markets to whole 
economies and economic sectors. They cite Minsky’s Financial Instability 
Hypothesis (‘FIH’) (Minsky, 1977, 1982, 1989) which builds on Keynes’ theory 
(Minsky was a student of Keynes and very much influenced by him) as the 
principal theory to underpin their observations. The FIH attempts to explain the 
irrationality of financial markets during periods of extreme boom and bust and 
leading to a financial crisis. According to Minsky, the cycle takes the following 
form: boom - overestimation of expected returns - euphoria and band-wagon 
effect - profit-taking - the recognition that earlier expectations were unjustified.  
In the final stage as losses occur, panic sets in (the irrational herding instinct) 
together with revulsion and the overall discrediting of the subject of the boom 
in the first place. See Figure 2. The theory may apply to any asset and even a 
whole economy. As expansion develops, optimism increases and beliefs about 
the proper level of debt and risk change. Here, prices of financial assets rise and 
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the general level of speculation increases. (‘speculation’ refers to attempts by 
investors to bet on the future direction and psychology of the market, Minsky, 
1975, pp.120-23).  
 
Figure 3 
Charts of daily prices for four of the most popular cryptocurrencies,  
1 November, 2017 - 31 October, 2018. 
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Empirical evidence 
Over the last year (to 31 October, 2018) there has been a classic speculative 
bubble. See Figure 3. All the major cryptocurrencies experienced it. The Minsky 
moment occurred on or around 17 December 2017 for Bitcoin for example when 
it rose to $20,089 but then fell to $5,968.36 on 6 February 2018. Since then, 
particularly in recent weeks, the cryptocurrencies in my list have continued to 
decline, causing negative returns for the year as a whole although Bitcoin made 
a small positive return. (See the fifth column in Table 1). These results are 
consistent with typical bubbles where ultimately the price falls to below it was 
in the first place. 
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Table 2 
Bitcoin daily volume statistics across market moods 
1 November, 2017 - 31 October, 2018. 
 
 Period Daily volume 
No $m 
Boom 1 November to 5 December 2017 202,758 4,923 
Euphoria 6 December to 17 December 2017 851,776 14,414 
Revulsion 18 December 2017 to 31 January 2018 1,003,708 13824 
Disrespect 1 February to 31 October 2018  705,979 5,378 
 
It was argued earlier that a high price of a cryptocurrency would result in 
increased/high demand and high volume of trade, whereas a falling/low market 
price would result in low volume of trade. Over the year to 31 October, the 
average volume of trading in Bitcoin was significantly higher during the 
‘euphoria’ period than the ’boom’ and ‘disrespect’ periods. See Table 2.xi 
Presumably the high volume of activity during the ‘revulsion’ period was a result 
of disposals. 
 
Table 3 
Correlation coefficients of daily price changes for four of the main 
cryptocurrencies: 1 November, 2017 - 31 October, 2018. 
 
 Ethereum Litecoin Bitcoin Cash 
Bitcoin 0.635 0.605 0.427 
Ethereum  0.772 0.593 
Litecoin   0.455 
 
It has been argued that the prices and price movements are unrelated to 
economic events as cryptocurrencies have no intrinsic value in the same way 
that stocks and shares do and simply follow a random walk as market makers 
attempt to balance their books and maximise their profits. It could also be that 
as their prices (and price changes) are unrelated to economic events and left to 
the interaction between supply and demand, cryptocurrency prices may follow 
one another, e.g. led by Bitcoin the largest and arguably the ‘market leader’.  It 
is interesting therefore to see whether, cryptocurrencies move together as the 
charts in Figure 3 suggest. Table 3 shows the correlations between the chosen 
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cryptocurrencies in which there is an average correlation coefficient of around 
0.6 (1.0 is prefect positive correlation, -1.0 prefect negative correlation and zero, 
no correlation indicating total independence). This suggests that the main 
cryptocurrencies tend to follow one another but not entirely.  
 
Regulation and Abuse 
There are no international standards for the regulation of cryptocurrencies. 
Individual countries’ regulations range from none to an outright ban. 
Governments are still struggling to understand the technology and the 
regulatory implications. In the U.S, there has been a proposal to have a self-
regulating body similar to that for the U.S. securities industry. The FinTech 
industry is resisting this as it believes it will hamper developing technology and 
cites the Internet as an example.  
 
In the UK, The FCA has warned about the risks of investing in cryptocurrency 
CFDs and is about to issue an outright ban.xii Although as yet it does not have a 
responsibility for cryptocurrency and ICOs, as the FCA, regulates CFDs, and 
therefore firms offering CFDs must be authorised and supervised by the FCA, it 
is appropriate to warn customers about these risks.xiii  
 
Scams  
There are various cryptocurrency frauds and scams resulting from the 
anonymity involved in online trading and, in particular, blockchain which makes 
it difficult to trace the fraudsters.xiv Often victims are attracted by promises of 
large and unrealistic earnings through unique trading systems. In some cases, 
these systems do not even exist; in others, the high returns claimed are 
unachievable. Whilst there have been thefts of cryptocurrency, most frauds and 
scams involve market abuse whether in the form of the manipulation of market 
prices through pump and dump schemes or ICOs which are usually either Ponzi 
schemes or simple frauds. Cryptocurrency has its own version of Ponzi schemes 
involving it simply being stolen or found missing from an exchange.  
 
In the UK, Action Fraud, its fraud and cybercrime reporting agency, has said that 
crimes linked to Bitcoin increased to 999 in 2017 from 320 in 2016. It has warned 
the public about the growing problem of criminals using the reputation of 
prominent people in cryptocurrency scams without their consent.xv In March 
2018 alone, Action Fraud received 21 reports of this kind, with a total reported 
loss of more than £34,000 to victims. 
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Pump and dump schemes 
In a pump-and-dump scheme, promoters ‘pump’ up the price of a security 
creating a speculative frenzy, then ‘dump’ some of their holdings at the 
artificially inflated price.   
 
These schemes are common in cryptocurrency markets. In government-
regulated stock markets such as the London and New York stock exchanges, 
pump and dump schemes are illegal and fraudsters have been prosecuted 
(Barnes, 2008, 2009a, 2009b, 2011).xvi However, cryptocurrency exchanges are, 
for the moment, unregulated and difficult to police and those involved have 
escaped prosecution. 
 
The organisers of these schemes openly use social media such as Reddit and 
other online forums and outlets. They argue that a price spike is evidence of a 
sustained rally, and that smart traders should get in before the coin goes ‘to the 
moon’. Participants are also asked to ‘push’ that cryptocurrency on social media 
networks. They may then discover that the coin’s price has risen sharply 
triggering ‘FOMO’ (‘fear of missing out’). Once a target price has been reached, 
or the scheme’s organizers decide that they’ve had enough and dumped their 
holdings, the cryptocurrency’s price will collapse. 
 
How this is done has been described by an organiser behind such a scheme.  
‘Pump and Dump guide 
STEP 1: Make sure you register on the exchange and have BTC [bitcoins] 
ready in your wallet. Keep in mind, it can take a while to transfer BTC. 
STEP 2: Group/Channel will announce the coin at the announced start time. 
Be sure to buy FAST! 
STEP 3 (IMPORTANT): Place your buy orders much higher (5x-10x) than the 
current price. This will ensure that your order is filled and you get it at the 
best price. If you set lower buy orders, someone else may clear sell walls 
before you and your order won't go through. You DON’T want to make this 
mistake. Set a higher buy order and it will be filled at the next best price  
EXAMPLE: Let's say the coin has sell orders at 300 and 305 sats. Put a buy 
order to 1500 sats with all of your BTC and you will buy all 3 orders from 
their defined price. If someone else acts before you and buys those lowest 
orders, than you will buy from 311 and 315 which is pretty good. But if you 
put your buy order at 300 sats, you won’t be able to buy at that moment 
due to the price fluctuating so fast. Be careful and get on that spaceship 
asap!  
17 
 
STEP 4: Once you have bought your coins, the next step is to promote the 
coin. Go to the Cryptopia Chatbox and hype up the coin w/o giving away 
any suspicion of a pump and dump. DON’T mention it is a Pump and Dump. 
Just big it up! “Wow, what is going on with xxx?” Hype it up in any other 
forums you are a member of as well. Creating hype and momentum is key! 
STEP 5: Sell with profit!’ 
(https://bitcointalk.org/index.php?topic=2886369.0). 
 
It seems inevitable that cryptocurrency markets (and, therefore, pump and 
dump schemes) will be regulated at some stage in the same way as the main 
stock exchanges. xvii 
 
Manipulation of the cryptocurrency markets 
Given the lack of regulation and the openness by traders about the existence of 
pump and dump schemes, it is not surprising that there have been claims that 
the market is manipulated at the highest levels. 
 
The manipulation of prices 
Griffin and Shams (2018), two academics, have presented empirical evidence 
showing a pattern of price support for Bitcoin using Tethers, a less popular 
cryptocurrency. Tethers are created by Tether Ltd. often in large blocks, typically 
200 million. Almost all of the new coins are then moved to Bitfinex.  Tether and 
Bitfinex share a management team, although little is known about how the two 
businesses cooperate. Bitfinex was originally a Bitcoin exchange but now 
services other cryptocurrencies. Griffin and Shams examined 87 of the largest 
purchases of Bitcoins with Tether between March 2017 and March 2018 and 
discovered that when Bitcoins’ price fell, purchases with Tether tended to 
increase, helping to reverse the decline.  
 
There have been other claims of manipulation involving Tether. Bloomberg 
recently published an article (29 June 2018) entitled “Crypto Coin Tether Defies 
Logic on Kraken’s Market, Raising Red Flags” claiming that whilst the prices of 
other cryptocurrencies fluctuate in line with buy and sell orders, Tether remains 
unaffected. They looked at 56,000 trades that were processed on the exchange 
during May and June and, in consultation with experts, concluded that the lack 
of movement was unbelievable. None had seen a price fail to react to large 
transactions in this way. 
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The manipulation of reported volume 
In addition to the manipulation of prices, it has also been claimed that volume 
data are reported incorrectly in order to raise the visibility and credibility of a 
cryptocurrency or exchange. CoinMarketCap has recently been criticized for 
overstating cryptocurrency volumes due to the way data are extracted from 
exchanges and exacerbated by the way the platforms record trading activity 
(McIntosh, 2018). McIntosh quotes various experts who support this view but 
find it difficult to prove. In another article, Ribes identifies LiveCoinWatch and 
OKex as the main culprits after attempting to check volatility by seeing to what 
extent cryptocurrency prices would be affected by the selling of $50,000 of a 
given coin. He found some massive discrepancies in slippage between 
exchanges, ‘the kind that can only be explained by some [volume] figures being 
overstated as much as 95% (Golstein, 2018a).xviii 
 
Cryptocurrency prices may be affected by bots. Bots are used in financial 
markets to execute trading decisions for a trader according to a specified 
algorithm. They are used extensively in cryptocurrency markets but, in some 
instances, maliciously. A recent case is of a ‘harassing bot’ which would post an 
order to sell Ether at a price lower than what other sellers were offering, 
prompting traders to try to make a buy. However, immediately before traders 
completed the purchase, the bot would cancel its sell order. As a result, buy 
orders were posted, raising the Cryptocurrency’s price on other exchanges 
(Golstein, S. (2018b). 
 
The practice of faking orders and then cancelling them is known as ‘spoofing’, in 
order to create the impression that the supply or demand for an asset is higher 
than it actually is. Although this practice has been outlawed in most futures and 
stock markets, it is claimed it is rampant in the manipulation of cryptocurrency 
prices and trading (Vigna and Osipovic, 2018).  
 
As a result of these revelations, the US Justice Department has opened a criminal 
investigation into price manipulation of popular cryptocurrencies like Bitcoin, 
focused on specific manipulative activities such as spoofing and pump-and-
dump schemes.xix  
 
The manipulation of location 
Some cryptocurrency firms including some major cryptocurrency exchanges, 
have been accused of having ‘fake’ headquarters, i.e. their headquarters are 
stated to be at a certain address, but they aren’t actually there (McIntosh, 
2018b). The best-known case is that of KuCoin, a cryptocurrency exchange that 
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stated it was based in Hong Kong. Writing under the name ‘Jackson Wong’ it has 
been revealed that what was stated to be KuCoin’s headquarters were in fact 
empty offices. Wong concluded that ‘KuCoin has never been there and they lied 
to us the whole time’. KuCoin issued an official statement: ‘There have been 
rumours that KuCoin’s central office in Hong Kong is empty. In fact, KuCoin’s 
public address in Hong Kong is merely a mailing address of one of KuCoin’s many 
subsidiary companies. KuCoin Headquarters is in Singapore. KuCoin has always 
been a global firm, with over 300 employees and four major offices in China, the 
Philippines, Singapore, and Thailand’. It did not provide the address of where its 
offices in Singapore were located. A UK example is that of BlackRock Crypto 
Asset Management (a firm unconnected to BlackRock) which stated its head 
office was in London but on investigation of the address there was no evidence.xx 
 
It is thought that there are other cases. The reason for this is the transient nature 
of companies. The location of a company’s headquarters is largely irrelevant 
because most business is conducted online anyway. Companies will move their 
offices to jurisdictions with more favourable laws and regulations. McIntosh 
(2018b) points to the crypto-related bans that China imposed in 2017: 
exchanges located there simply relocated. Binance, the world’s largest crypto-
exchange’s recent decision to relocate from Hong Kong to Malta as an example. 
 
The manipulation of market capitalisation (or ‘marcap’) 
Despite not having shares in the way limited companies do, cryptocurrencies’ 
market capitalisations are reported. This is a concept in finance related to the 
number of shares in existence for a limited company, defined as the number of 
shares multiplied by their market price. There are various problems with 
applying this to cryptocurrencies, making the data misleading. A company’s 
market capitalisation approximates to its value, representing how much would 
be needed to buy all its shares - its intrinsic value to use the term used earlier. 
Certainly, if the marcap is significantly below its perceived value, this may bring 
about a takeover bid. 
 
A cryptocurrency has no intrinsic value. Its only value is the market price of the 
coins. But unlike a company, it is unlikely that all of these could, or would, be 
bought making the marcap unrealistic. There is also the issue of how many of 
the coins are effectively in circulation. It is possible for the founder/effective 
owners of a cryptocurrency to issue coins to themselves – conceivably, an 
unlimited number given their private nature. This is not so easy for a company 
as it will need agreement by shareholders and will dilute the share price. For 
example, if a company made a one for one share bonus issue raising no funds, 
its intrinsic value would be unchanged, the value of each share being halved but 
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their number doubled. In the case of cryptocurrency, such an issue of new coins 
would not affect the intrinsic value of the cryptocurrency (as it is zero) but, as 
the coin’s market price would not be affected, this would double its marcap. 
  
In the case of most cryptocurrency exchanges and other service providers, it is 
reasonably easy to identify their location and legal status. This is not the case 
with many of the cryptocurrency developers and founders and the entities they 
use. Whilst some have specified a limit to the number of coins they will issue 
and the terms on which this will be done (e.g. Bitcoins), many have not. It is also 
not known how many coins were issued initially and whether these were later 
sold. The limited evidence suggests that these individuals became very rich out 
of the issue of large numbers of coins to themselves and they are still holding 
most of these coins.xxi 
 
Whilst this raises questions about the real wealth of these individuals (especially 
given the recent falls in the market prices of most cryptocurrencies making it 
even more difficult to realise their holdings) it suggests that there may be a large 
proportion of coins technically ‘in circulation’ and part of the marcap calculation 
that are effectively unrealisable and valueless. It also suggests that marcap may 
be an inappropriate and inaccurate measure of the size of a cryptocurrency in 
practice. It is likely to be within the power of such an owner to raise the 
perceived market value of the cryptocurrency simply by issuing new coins to 
him/herself. Clearly there is a need for accountability in this area. 
 
Initial Coin Offerings (‘ICO’)  
An ICO (also called an Initial Public Coin Offering ‘IPCO’) is a largely unregulated 
means by which usually start-up companies issue virtual coins or tokens (also 
called ‘user tokens’ or ‘app coins’) on a blockchain exchange for legal tender or 
cryptocurrencies, to raise funds for new ventures. These tokens can be traded 
on cryptocurrency exchanges or serve various functions, ranging from granting 
holders access to a service to entitling them to company dividends. Depending 
on their function, crypto-tokens may be classified as utility tokens or security 
tokens.xxii The term was clearly inspired by initial public offerings that companies 
do to sell stock to investors. ICOs are very similar to the IPO dot.com bubble of 
the late 1990's (Barnes, 2009a p. 82-3). However, unlike IPOs, ICOs are usually 
designed so that investors do not get an ownership stake in the start-ups as if 
the cryptocurrency does provide an ownership stake, the company must comply 
with securities law.  
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By May 2018, over $7.3bn had been raised in this way, $5.5bn of which in 
2017.xxiii 40% of all ICOs (446 transactions raising $1.76bn) were based in the 
European Union, the second largest region was North America (244 transactions 
raising $1.076bn). xxiv 
 
ICO frauds and scams 
These include pump and dump schemes, Ponzi schemes and simple theft. There 
have been three recent authoritative studies to support the view that most ICOs 
are fraudulent in one way or another. 
 
First, a survey by the Wall Street Journal published in May 2018xxv examined 
documents from 1,450 ICOs. Whilst some of the firms were still active, others 
had been shut down, investors claiming losses of $273m according to lawsuits 
and regulatory reports. The study found that 271 ICOs (nearly one in five) 
contained what it regarded as ‘red flags’, that is plagiarized investor documents, 
promises of guaranteed returns and missing or fake executive teams. In 111 
cases, entire sections were repeated word-for-word from other white papers.xxvi 
The copied sections included descriptions of marketing plans, security issues and 
technical features.  
 
Second, a survey by the Satis Group published in March, 2018xxvii found that four 
out of five ICOs were scams. The study examined ICOs with a market cap of 
$50m or more and divided them into six categories: 
• ‘Scams (pre-trading)’ (81%) - offerings that had no intention of fulfilment 
and deemed by the investment community (message boards, website or 
other online information) to be a scam, 
• ‘Failed (pre-trading)’ (6%) - offerings that were not completed but were 
abandoned as a result of insufficient funds raised, 
• ‘Gone dead (pre-trading)’(5%) - offerings that succeeded in raising the 
necessary funding and completed the process but failed to be listed on an 
exchange, 
• ‘Dwindling (trading)’ (2.8%) - offerings that succeeded in raising the 
necessary funding and completed the process and listed on an exchange 
but had one or less of the following success criteria: (1) deployment of a 
chain/distributed ledger (in the case of a base-layer protocol) or 
product/platform (in the case of an app/utility token) (2) had a transparent 
project roadmap posted on their website or (3) had Github code 
contribution activity in a surrounding three-month period. 
• ‘Promising (trading)’ (1.6%) - satisfied two of the above criteria. 
• ‘Successful (trading)’ (3.8%) - satisfied allthree of the above criteria. 
22 
 
 
Third, an Ernst & Young study published in December 2017 estimated that 10% 
of the money raised from ICOs was effectively stolen.xxviii 
 
A good example of cryptocurrency as part of a Ponzi or pyramid scheme is 
OneCoin. OneCoin used a marketing approach in which customers bought 
‘educational products’ (the material was plagiarised) and received tokens to 
mine the cryptocurrency. In order to earn more ‘tokens’, customers needed to 
recruit others to join OneCoin. These new members, in turn, were required to 
recruit others. OneCoin ran into trouble with financial regulators in various 
countries around the world who had warned people against investing in 
cryptocurrencies and that it was probably a Ponzi scheme. Its offices were raided 
and closed down; its founder and CEO, Dr Ruja Ignatova was arrested in 
Germany in November 2017 together with other senior management who were 
arrested in various parts of the world. 
 
The regulation of ICOs 
There has also been no international consistency in the regulation of ICOs. China 
and South Korea have banned ICOs, referring to them as 'illegal fundraising' 
whilst Canadian regulators have accepted them as part of its policy of supporting 
innovative fintech projects. The European Securities and Markets Authority 
(‘ESMA’) has also denounced ICOs, warning consumers that they are 'very risky 
and highly speculative investments'. 
 
In the US and various other countries, regulators have said coins and tokens 
should be categorized as securities, like stocks and bonds. If a coin is categorized 
as a security, it has to follow all relevant securities law, such as registering with 
the authorities and ensuring that people buying the coins are properly 
accredited and vetted. However, no coin offerings have followed these rules, 
instead ensuring that investors do not get an ownership stake in the start-ups. 
(If a coin provides an ownership stake, the company is required to comply with 
all securities law.) The SEC has also warned investors that many deals in the  
cryptocurrencies market could be violating securities lawsxxix and has launched 
a website containing a fake coin offering as an illustration of what to avoid.xxx 
The agency has filed civil charges in four cases involving ICOs.  
 
Two recent cases illustrate the approaches likely to be taken in the US. In January 
2018, the SEC obtained a court order to prevent the US bank AriseBank 
attempting to use an ICO to raise $1bn for its “AriseCoin” cryptocurrency. It 
stated that the bank had ‘falsely stated that it purchased an FDIC-insured bank” 
and had “allegedly omitted to disclose the criminal background of key 
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executives’.xxxi The Tezos blockchain has recently become the subject of a 
number of class actions relating to its $232m ICO, the plaintiffs alleging that the 
ICO was an unregistered, non-exempt offer representing a sale of securities in 
violation of the federal securities laws.xxxii 
 
In the UK, the FCA has expressed uncertainty of whether an ICO falls within its 
regulatory boundaries, stating that firms will be considered on a case-by-case 
basis, depending on how they are structured under the Financial Services and 
Markets Act 2000 (FSMA). FSMA states that no firm may carry on a regulated 
activity in the UK unless it is authorised by the FCA or is exempted. To carry on 
regulated activities, the firm must be performing specified activities relating to 
specified investments, as defined in the FSMA (Regulated Activities) Order 2001 
(‘RAO’). 
 
The theft of cryptocurrency 
Cryptocurrencies are not immune to the threat of hacking. Bitcoin has been 
subject to over 40 thefts, some exceeding $1m. Two of the largest are described 
below, other recent cases are listed in Table 4. 
 
The theft of coins worth £380m from Coincheck, one of Japan’s largest 
exchanges reported in January 2018 was the world’s largest cryptocurrency 
theft. About 523m of the exchange’s NEM coins were sent to another account 
and not recovered. The exchange suspended deposits and withdrawals for all 
cryptocurrencies except Bitcoins. The stolen assets were reported to have been 
kept in a ‘hot wallet’, a digital storage option connected to the internet, as 
opposed to a ‘cold wallet’, where assets are kept offline.xxxiii 
 
Mt Gox, based in Japan and the largest bitcoin exchange in the world handling 
over 70% of all bitcoin transactions worldwide, was the victim of two hacks. The 
first, in 2011, was probably the result of a compromised computer belonging to 
an auditor of the company. The hackers used the auditor’s access to the 
exchange to artificially alter the bitcoins to one percent of their nominal value 
and transfer 2,000 bitcoins from customer accounts on the exchange, which 
were then sold. Also, 650 bitcoins were purchased from the exchange an 
artificially low price by Mt. Gox customers, none of which were ever returned.   
 
The second, in 2014, forced the exchange to suspend all trading and close down 
its website. It was found that hackers had raided the exchange and stolen 
744,408 bitcoins belonging to its customers (6% of all bitcoin in existence at the 
time and valued at $400m) together with 100,000 bitcoins belonging to the 
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company. $27m was also missing from the company’s bank accounts. The 
exchange was declared insolvent and a few days later Mt. Gox filed for 
bankruptcy protection in Japan and the US. It later transpired that from as early 
as September 2011 it had been operating while technically insolvent.  
 
The thefts are remarkable in terms of their number, size and irony, given the 
cryptographic efforts by exchanges to ensure their security. The thefts of stocks 
and shares from a conventional stock exchange or from a financial institution 
holding shares for clients is unknown.  
 
Table 4 
Large thefts of cryptocurrency since 2010 and those in 2018. 
 
Announcement 
Date 
Exchange Amount 
lost 
Details 
August 2010 BTC $12.9m 184 bn Bitcoins 
August 2011, 
February2014 
Mt Gox $460m See text 
September 2012 Bitfloor, Atlanta, USA. $250,000 24,000 Bitcoins 
December 2014 BitPay, Luxemburg $1.8m 3,000 Bitcoins 
January 2015 Bitstamp $5.1m Bitcoin 
June 2016 DAO $50m Ether 
July 2016 Steemit.com $85,000 Steem and Steem 
Dollars 
August 2016 Bitfinex $72m 120,000 bitcoins 
July 2017 Veritaseum $8m Veritaseum 
July 2017 Parity $32m Ether 
August 2017 Enigma, USA $500,000 Ether 
November 2017 Tether $30.9m Tether  
December 2017 NiceHash, Slovenia $63 Bitcoins 
January 2018 Coincheck, Tokyo, 
Japan 
$380 See text 
February 2018 Bitgrail, Italy $195m Nano tokens 
June 2018 Coinrail $40m Dent and tron 
June 2018 Bithumb $30m tokens 
July 2018 Bancor, 
Isreal/Switzerland 
$23m Ether, Pundi X’s NPXS 
token and in Bancor’s 
BNT. 
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Other forms of malicious behaviour include what is known as ‘ransomware’, 
where victims are forced to pay to have their systems liberated from malware, 
and ‘cryptojacking’. This involves the hacking of a system and using it to mine 
cryptocurrencies. Money is not stolen from victims; unwanted software is simply 
being unknowingly run on their computers. Given the amount of computing 
effort that mining involves, this may be costly for the victim and over recent 
years these attacks have become common.  
 
Final remarks 
The size, frequency and nature of manipulation, scams and fraud in the market 
makes them appear endemic. Undoubtedly, they have arisen from the lack of 
regulation, accountability and desire for privacy by founders, owners and 
developers.  
 
Whilst this is understandable given its infancy and rapid developments within 
the industry, until it recognises the harm being caused by regulatory arbitrage 
and accepts the need for regulation and improved accountability, the 
perception of a market that is to be distrusted will continue. (The reader may be 
reminded of Akerlof’s market for lemons (1970) in which the poor quality of 
some of the goods in a particular market forces down consumers’ expectations 
and prices to such an extent as to cause them to expect all goods to be inferior 
and undermine the market). To some extent, this is similar to the state of e-
business in the 1990s in the UK when the confidence of both business and 
consumers to do e-business was minimal and the Internet likened to a jungle. 
This did not last. Nowadays, we freely transact in this way because recognise 
that whilst scams and frauds remain, we have a better understanding of the risks 
involved and businesses recognise the need for security and honesty. 
 
The other aspect giving rise to current problems in the cryptocurrency industry 
is the volatility of the market, making it attractive to speculators. More stability 
and confidence in the market would help to reduce these perceptions and re-
establish it as a safe, efficient and alternative means of banking. 
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ENDNOTES 
i There is confusion over their terminology. Virtual currencies are a type of digital currency but not all 
virtual currencies are digital, Cryptocurrencies are separate, because of their use of cryptography. 
Other types of digital currency also exist, but in practice cryptocurrencies dominate the market. See 
Wagner (2014) for a discussion and diagrammatic explanation of these distinctions. 
ii Provided by, for example, Plus 500 and CMC markets. 
iii https://www.coinmarkets.net/all/views/all/ 
iv It is not known whether Nakamoto is a person or a pseudonym Rumours range from Satoshi being a 
Japanese developer through to a cryptography and computer science expert living in the USA or 
Europe, or even a pseudonym for a group of individuals. 
v The process of converting plain text into a secure ‘encrypted’ language using algorithms that are hard 
to break. 
vi There have been many instances in which cryptocurrency has been used for money laundering. For 
example, see the Mueller indictment relating to various Russian hacking operatives and their use of 
bitcoin (netyksho_et_al_indictment.pdf available at https://www.justice.gov/file/1080281). A recent 
case is that of Theresa Lynn Tetley, known as ‘Bitcoin Maven’ admitted to running an unlicensed 
Bitcoin-for-cash exchange business and laundering Bitcoin purchased from the proceeds of drug 
trafficking, was sentenced in July 2018 to one year and one day in prison and fined $20,000. 
(www.bitmoneynews.com/bitcoin-news/bitcoin-maven-theresa-lynn-tetley-sentenced-to-12-
months-jail-for-money-laundering/). For more generic empirical evidence, see Foley et al (2018) 
calculate that approximately one-quarter of bitcoin users are involved in illegal activity. 
vii This may be defined as where the price movement on one day is not correlated with the price 
movement the following day, i.e. they are independent, where the price change in the first day may 
not be used to forecast the change during the second day. 
viii Increased customer demand is caused by a reduction in price. Similarly, Increased supply by 
suppliers is caused by an increase in price. 
                                                          
28 
 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
ix It was first used on 5 December 1996 by Alan Greenspan, chairman of the US Federal Reserve Board 
to describe the behaviour of investors in the US and the mood behind the rise in stock market prices 
between 1994 and 1999. It became his most famous quotation. 
x The South Sea Bubble was a Ponzi scheme involving misleading information involving the British 
government, share price manipulation and fraud (Barnes, 2009 p.71-3). 
xi  Two measures of volume are reported in Table 2. The usual measure is the monetary vale (column 
XX). As this overstates volume when the price of bitcoin is high, the number of coins is also calculated 
(the monetary value devided by the average price that day). 
xii See https://www.financemagnates.com/cryptocurrency/regulation/fca-eyes-outright-ban-on-
cryptocurrency-cfds-report-says/ For the warning see https://www.fca.org.uk/news/news-
stories/consumer-warning-about-risks-investing- cryptocurrency-cfds. 
xiii Individual complaints need to be referred to The Financial Ombudsman Service and consumers also 
have access to the Financial Services Compensation Scheme (FSCS) although this protection does not 
compensate customers for any losses from trading.   
xiv A good example of this scam is New Tycoon Plus which promises investors massive gains on small 
investments in cryptocurrency mining equipment. However, the returns are unsustainable and there 
is no indication where the money actually goes. See https://marksrealreviews.com/new-tycoon-plus. 
xv Deborah Meaden from the BBC’s Dragons' Den and Martin Lewis, the founder of 
MoneySavingExpert.com have featured on fraudulent cryptocurrency investment websites falsely 
claiming to be endorsed by them. (https://www.actionfraud.police.uk/news/well-known-names-
being-used-in-cryptocurrency-scams-apr18) 
xvi Pump and dump is a type of insider dealing in the UK. Whilst the former has often been successfully 
prosecuted, the latter have been rarer, the most notable instance being the City Slickers case (Barnes, 
2009b). 
xvii It should not necessarily be thought that pump-and-dump schemes are not technically unlawful as 
in the UK anyway, they could fall within the general offence of fraud under the Fraud Act 2006, Section 
2. 
xviii Slippage is a term referring to the difference between the price of an asset at a given moment 
and the price actually paid. The difference occurs because the market can change in the time that it 
takes to request, process and execute an order.  
xix https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2018-05-24/bitcoin-manipulation-is-said-to-be-focus-
of-u-s-criminal-probe. 
xxIt transpires that the company is a “clone” firm and not authorised by the FCA and the subject of an 
FCA warning. See https://www.fca.org.uk/news/warnings/blackrock-crypto-asset-management-
limited-clone. 
xxi See Kauflin (2018) regarding the Forbes billionaires list for 2018and Lanz, (2018) who states that of the 40 
billionaires under the age of 40, five have businesses directly linked to the world of crypto money. 
xxii These tokens represent future access to a company’s product or service may be sold by the start-
up for the service it is developing; they are not designed as investments.  
xxiii Past and current IPOs are listed on https://www.coinstaker.com/ico-list/. 
xxiv Available at https://www.coinspeaker.com/2017/12/01/europe-accounts-nearly-half-funds-
raised-via-icos-atomicos-report-finds/. 
xxv Entitled ‘Buyer Beware: Hundreds of Bitcoin Wannabes Show Hallmarks of Fraud’ and written by 
Shane Shifflett and Coulter Jones May 17, 2018 available at https://www.wsj.com/articles/buyer-
beware-hundreds-of-bitcoin. 
xxvi A ‘white paper’ is the industry’s term for a document that details mission statements, team 
biographies and the technical specifics of a project – the nearest the issuer would get to a prospectus. 
xxvii Available at https://medium.com/satis-group/ico-quality-development-trading-e4fef28df04f. 
xxviii Available at https://www.ey.com/Publication/vwLUAssets/ey-research-initial-coin-offerings-
icos/%24File/ey-research-initial-coin-offerings-icos.pdf. 
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xxix As a general rule ICO tokens may be securities and, if so, must be registered with the SEC or qualify 
for an exemption in order to be offered or sold within the United States. Violations expose issuers not 
just to the risk of SEC enforcement, but also the possibility of liability under Section 12(a)(1) of the 
Securities Act, a private right of action that provides recessionary damages on a strict liability basis for 
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